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Fradella and White’s critical review of stop-and-
frisk is both engaging and thought-provoking. 
Detailing the evolution of a policing tactic from a 
particularised activity founded upon reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity to a broader and at times, 
far more aggressive crime-control strategy, the review 
raises a number of interesting points about how 
policies and approaches that have a legitimate—and 
indeed necessary—place and function within the 
policing and crime reduction spaces can also have the 
very real potential to be controversial and problematic. 
As they explain in relation to stop-and-frisk, while it 
is known that some police officers have been engaged 
in improper and illegal behaviours during stops more 
concerning is their suggestion that stop-and-frisk is a 
further iteration of a persistent undercurrent of racial 
injustice in American policing. As regards the latter 
suggestion, the review’s consideration of the social 
costs of the tactic is particularly telling. 
It might be argued that the British Government’s 
PREVENT strategy could be seen to be similarly 
problematic and controversial. Following a series of 
Islamist-inspired terror attacks in the early 2000s in 
the United States (US), United Kingdom (UK), Spain 
and Bali among others, the UK Government was 
catalysed to develop a realm of policy measures and 
approaches that sought to counter the threat posed by 
terrorism and the extremist ideologies that were seen 
to be underpinning them. These policies were 
categorised in terms of:  
 
 Pursuance: stopping terrorist attacks by 
detecting, prosecuting and disrupting those 
who plot to carry out attacks;  
 
 Protection: strengthen against a terrorist 
attack in terms of public transport systems, 
national infrastructure and public places for 
instance; and 
 
 Preparation: mitigating the impact of a 
terrorist attack where that one might cannot 
be stopped.  
 
A more innovative type of policy also emerged, 
one that placed a greater emphasis on “preventing” or 
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“countering” violent extremism whereby the state— 
via its actors and institutions—would seek to intervene 
in order to try and stop individuals from becoming 
terrorists or supporting those who do. Resonating with 
the justification for a stop whereby an individual can 
be approached for the purpose of investigating the 
possibility of criminal behaviour despite there being 
no probable cause to make an arrest, the rationale for 
PREVENT justifies pre-criminal intervention where 
an individual is believed to be vulnerable to being 
radicalised by extremist ideologies or drawn into 
terrorist activities. While PREVENT was designed to 
be a policy that sought to counter all forms of violent 
extremism irrespective of the underpinning ideology, 
the general perception was that it was a part of the 
post-9/11 political zeitgeist that unduly scrutinised 
Muslims and Islam as also, Islamist-inspired 
extremism (Allen, 2017).  
PREVENT was therefore duly incorporated into 
the UK Government’s four-stranded counter-terrorism 
strategy named CONTEST. While CONTEST was 
first introduced in 2003, PREVENT was added later 
and in direct response to the public transport terror 
attacks in London in July 2005. Seeking to 
“mainstream” policy approaches which sought to 
prevent violent extremism, PREVENT has undergone 
various iterations under subsequent Governments. 
Nonetheless, it has continued to have three primary 
objectives (U.K. Home Office, 2011): 
 
 Respond to the ideological challenge of 
terrorism and the threat from those who 
promote it; 
 
 Prevent people from being drawn into 
terrorism and ensure that they are given 
appropriate advice and support; and 
 
 Work with sectors and institutions where 
there are risks of radicalisation, for instance 
health, education, and criminal justice. 
 
Integral to the second objective is CHANNEL, a 
Government programme designed to stop individuals 
from being radicalised. As regards the latter, public 
sector employees such as doctors, social workers, 
teachers and lecturers now have a statutory duty 
placed on them to report those seen to be vulnerable to 
radicalisation thereby referring them to the 
CHANNEL programme (Allen, 2017).   
Early iterations of PREVENT not only saw 
Government mobilising interfaith structures to counter 
perceptions of Muslim isolation but so too did they 
partner with Muslim communities and organisations to 
support policy approaches (O’Toole, 2012). Despite 
the investment of significant amounts of public 
money—almost £80 million ($105 million) was spent 
on around 1,000 schemes in its first six years 
(Casciani, 2014)—very few of the schemes were 
adequately evaluated thereby leaving a gap in 
knowledge about how successful the policy has been. 
Some manifestations were undeniably detrimental not 
least Birmingham’s “Project Champion” where more 
than 200 CCTV cameras were installed in two of the 
most densely populated Muslim areas of the city 
(Isakjee & Allen, 2013). In line with Fradella and 
White’s acknowledgement of the potential and actual 
misuse of stop-and-frisk, “Project Champion” not only 
violated the individual rights of those who lived under 
the 24-hour scrutiny, but so too did research show that 
the cameras caused emotional and psychological 
distress (Iskjee & Allen, 2013). “Project Champion” 
also put an undue strain on the relationship between 
local communities—especially Muslim 
communities—and the police, something that also 
damaged police legitimacy and efficacy. That the 
cameras were also installed in densely populated 
Muslim areas also went some way to blurring what 
Fradella and White refer to as the line between a sound 
and constitutionally approved policy and what might 
amount to little more than racial—or in the 
Birmingham context, religious—profiling. 
When the Conservative-led Coalition 
Government came to power in 2010, it immediately 
sought to undertake a review of PREVENT. 
Concluding that existing approaches were far from 
effective (U.K. Home Office, 2011), O’Toole (2012) 
identified three changes to how it was subsequently 
implemented. First, PREVENT shifted away from 
Muslim and other communities to more intelligence-
led emphases on hot spots of extremist activity. 
Second, there was a categorical declaration that there 
was to be no engagement with “Islamists” or their 
sympathisers. And third, there was the desire to ensure 
that PREVENT was separate from policies and 
approaches that sought to promote better inclusion and 
cohesion. However, by the time the review had been 
undertaken a growing loss of confidence and trust in 
PREVENT was becoming increasingly evident. More 
so, a number of very real concerns were being 
expressed by a number of different critical voices. 
Among others, these included those voicing that 
PREVENT: was constructing Muslims as “suspect 
communities” that required greater scrutiny and 
surveillance (Pantazis & Pemberton, 2009; Hickman, 
Thomas, Nickels, & Silvestri, 2011); that it was an 
insidious state-endorsed policy that was designed to 
spy on Muslims and their communities (Spalek & 
Lambert, 2007, 2008; Kundnani, 2014); that it 
reinforced negative stereotypes and suspicions about 
Muslims and Islam that in turn had the potential to 
justify Islamophobia (Alam & Husband, 2013; Isakjee 
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& Allen, 2013; Bonino, 2013); and that it was a top-
down mechanism through which to impose a 
Government-backed “British Islam” that would be 
compatible with Western, secular and liberal values 
(Allen & Guru, 2012; Brown, 2008; Jones, 2013). 
While innately different, some significant resonance 
between the social costs attributed to the U.S.-based 
practice of stop-and-frisk and the UK’s PREVENT 
would seem to be apparent. 
With the introduction of the Counter-Terrorism 
and Security Act 2015, the now Conservative-only UK 
Government made further significant changes to 
PREVENT including the introduction of the public 
sector statutory duty. Identifying public sector workers 
as uniquely placed to see “changes” in behaviour and 
outlook of those being radicalised or vulnerable to 
extremist ideologies, criticisms and concerns 
expressed about PREVENT have further intensified. 
Particularly problematic has been the notion that 
‘changes’ are easily identifiable. Such is far from new 
however, having been in circulation for over a decade 
and traceable back to the New Labour Government’s 
Home Secretary, John Reid (Allen, 2010). Meeting 
with Muslim parents in East London, Reid was at 
pains to inform them that they needed to be vigilant in 
watching their children for the ‘tell-tale signs’ of 
extremism. While oft-repeated since, no politician has 
yet set out exactly what those “tell-tale signs” are or 
indeed might be. Nor has any iteration of PREVENT.  
The introduction of the new PREVENT public 
duty is also analogous to Fradella and White’s 
explanation of the transition from stop-and-frisk to 
“Stop, Question, and Frisk” in that neither have helped 
to ameliorate the problems and concerns. An example 
of this can be seen with the experience of Mohammed 
Umar Farooq (Allen, 2017). A postgraduate student at 
Staffordshire University, Farooq was studying on its 
Terrorism, Crime and Global Security MA 
programme. Sitting in the University’s main library 
reading books listed on the programme’s reading list, 
Farooq was falsely accused of being a terrorist. Having 
spotted the books he was reading, a member of the 
University’s staff decided to question Farooq about his 
religion and his attitudes towards homosexuality, 
Islamic State and al-Qaida. Following the 
conversation, the member of staff reported Farooq to 
University security guards who escorted him from the 
library before formally interviewing him about many 
of the same topics. Prompting three months of 
investigations, Staffordshire University eventually 
apologised to Farooq for the distress caused. However, 
it chose not to extend the apology to the fact that the 
member of staff became suspicious because he was 
identified as being Muslim. As the University put it, 
while the member of staff had “misjudged” the sight 
of seeing a Muslim reading the book had raised “too 
many red flags” not to act (Ramesh & Halliday, 2015).  
As naïve as it is dangerous, it is wholly feasible 
that those tasked with searching for the ever-elusive 
“tell-tale signs” will simplistically reduce them to 
markers that merely equate radicalisation with being 
“Muslim” or “more Muslim” (Allen, 2017). Whether 
visual as in growing a beard or wearing the niqab, or 
vocal as in talking openly about religion or voicing 
political views about British foreign policy, given that 
public sector workers have a duty to report “changes” 
in behaviour and outlook so it would seem likely that 
there will be more Farooq’s being unfairly and 
inappropriately scrutinised. It is for this reason that the 
implementation of PREVENT has the potential to be 
seen—and subsequently charged—in terms of it 
functioning akin to a manifestation of institutional 
racism. Given the onus on identifying and 
subsequently referring an individual lies with 
individual public-sector employees—who also happen 
to be ordinary members of the public—so there is 
significant scope for unfounded perceptions and 
personal prejudices to be the main driver for 
identification and referral (Allen, 2017). Here again, 
significant resonance can be seen to exist between 
PREVENT and stop-and-frisk whereby the social cost 
of PREVENT has the potential to have a 
disproportionately detrimental impact on minority 
groups, in particular the UK’s Muslim communities. 
Like “Stop, Question, and Frisk,” PREVENT too is 
seen to be highly contentious among certain minorities 
in the UK as also among some within the UK’s various 
police forces. The latter being most evident with the 
former Chief Superintendent of the Metropolitan 
Police, Dal Babu describing PREVENT as a “toxic 
brand” (Halliday & Dodd, 2015). 
In line with Fradella and White and their rightful 
observations about stop-and-frisk, there is little doubt 
that if implemented judiciously then PREVENT 
clearly has the necessary potential to prevent criminal 
behaviour and activity in relation to extremism and 
terrorism. Having said that, like stop-and-frisk so too 
are changes needed as regards PREVENT. To this 
extent, ongoing research by the author in the city of 
Birmingham with those responsible for the design and 
implementation of PREVENT including the police, 
state officials and Muslim civil society actors is 
seeking to explore what these changes might be and 
how best they might be subsequently practised. It is 
highly likely that this ongoing research will identify 
factors that reflect some if not all of those identified 
by Fradella and White in terms of their particular 
sphere of inquiry. Highlighting the fact that policies 
have the very real potential for serious and detrimental 
social costs is in itself, import enough. Raising 
awareness of the fact that serious and detrimental 
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social costs can occur is however even more 
important. Fradella and White not achieve both, but in 
doing so, they also provide a lens through which to 
critically consider other resonant policies and 
approaches. 
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